In this paper, we assess the impact of financial incentives on the inflow in the public Disability Insurance (DI) scheme in the Netherlands. For this matter, the variation in replacement rates over different sectors is exploited to estimate the probability of DI enrolment over a sample of employees from the Dutch Income Panel (1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000). On the basis of these administrative data, we find a point estimate of the elasticity of DI enrolment with respect to the DI wealth rate of 2.5.
In the Netherlands, as well as in many other western countries, the number of participants in public Disability Insurance (DI) schemes has been growing over the past three decades, which has led to high expenditures on such schemes and a downward pressure on labour force participation. Compared to other countries, the use of DI in the Netherlands is relatively high. In 1999 the number of DI enrolments was 10.4 per 1000 insured workers, whereas enrolment in Germany and the United States equalled 5.3 and 6.0, respectively. In that same year, public expenditures on DI benefits equalled 2.7% of GDP in the Netherlands, while for Germany and the US expenditures equalled 1.0% and 0.7%, respectively. 2 Several possible explanations may exist for this difference. Unlike most other countries, DI in the Netherlands does not distinguish between occupational and social risks, and every worker is fully insured irrespective of his or her work history. Another difference is that disability is insured from a minimum of 15% of socalled 'earnings capacity', implying that any worker who loses at least 15% of his/her earnings due to disability will be covered by DI. A fourth reason may be the relatively attractive financial conditions in the Netherlands (OECD, 2003) . The influence of these financial conditions on DI enrolment is precisely the topic of this paper.
DI schemes are meant to provide insurance against the risk of earnings loss due to disability.
The growth in DI use can however not be explained by an increase of disability within the population (see, e.g., Aarts en de Jong, 1992) . Due to informational problems and imperfect disability evaluation, able people may receive DI benefits instead of working more hours, or receive DI benefits instead of unemployment benefits, early retirement benefits, or welfare.
Such improper use may help explaining the expansion of DI use in the Netherlands. Both employers and employees have experienced incentives to make use of DI in an improper way.
Employers have often considered DI schemes as a decent way to get rid of workers with low productivity compared to their wages, in particular older workers. Moreover, the burden of DI benefits was not directly borne by the employers. 3 On the other hand, the relatively generous DI benefits have attracted both persons who would otherwise have worked more hours and persons who would have been on early retirement benefits, unemployment benefits, or welfare. In particular, DI is considered to be an important alternative to the 'official' early retirement schemes (Woittiez et al., 1994 , Lindeboom, 1998 Kerkhofs et al., 1999) . This is further encouraged by the fact that workers experience high implicit taxes on continued work, as DI benefits are not subject to any actuarial adjustments (Kapteyn and de Vos, 1999) .
A number of empirical studies have confirmed the relationship between the number of participants in DI schemes and the local economic situation. Among the first studies for the Netherlands were Van den Bosch and Petersen (1983) and Roodenburg and Wong Meeuw Hing (1985) , who both conclude that the stock of DI-beneficiaries in the 1970s contained hidden unemployment. Based on the ratings of insurance physicians and ergonomists, Aarts and de Jong (1992) have estimated the extent to which DI-beneficiaries are able to work, and arrive at an implied structural share of hidden unemployment within the 1980 DI inflow of 33 to 51 percent. Estimates of Westerhout (1996) suggest that almost 50 percent of all participants in DI schemes in the Netherlands in the period 1973-1992 was in fact hidden unemployment. For later years (1988 and 1990) , Hassink et al. (1997) find a hidden unemployment rate in DI inflow of about 10 percent. 4 Moreover, Hassink (1996 Hassink ( , 2000 finds that about a quarter of the employees enrolling into DI are not replaced by new workers, that is the concerning jobs are destroyed. For other countries, such as the United States, there is an abundance of literature showing that the local DI schemes contain hidden unemployment (see, e.g., Autor and Duggan, 2002; Black et al., 2002) .
In an interesting study of Canadian DI, Gruber (2000) makes use of a policy change specific to the Quebec province to estimate the elasticity of labour supply of older persons with respect to DI benefits. His results imply point estimates of the elasticity of labour force non-participation with respect to DI benefits in the range 0.28-0.36. Given the fact that within his dataset the disabled constitute about one fifth of all non-participants, the elasticity of the probability of receiving DI benefits with respect to these benefits would equal about 1.6. This figure is actually even on the conservative side when it is thought that substitution within the category of non-participants is not taken into account, and that Gruber in fact identifies the short term elasticity (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999) . For the Netherlands, there is not much empirical evidence on the effect of financial incentives on DI enrolment. Aarts and de Jong (1992) estimate the probability of DI enrolment on a sample of individuals with sickness benefits, and find that a reduction in the replacement rate with 16 percent reduces the conditional DI enrolment probability by 54 percent, which implies a benefit elasticity of 3.5.
This study focuses on the determinants of DI enrolment with a particular focus on the effect of financial incentives. By using a rich micro dataset and sector specific collective labour agreements, we try to identify the elasticity of DI enrolment with respect to DI benefits. As a result of (sector-or firm-specific) collective labour agreements, benefits are usually higher than statutory benefits, and differ for individuals working in different sectors and firms. Therefore, the financial attractiveness of DI schemes differs between different sectors and firms. We exploit this variation in DI benefit levels to identify the effect of financial incentives on DI enrolment. Obviously, a special effort has been made to correct for unobserved sector-and firm-specific effects, so that the estimated elasticity will suffer the least possible from bias due to omitted variables.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the Dutch DI system, its history and its position between other forms of social security. Section 3 discusses the DI determination process, the determinants of DI enrolment, and the behaviour of individuals and program administrators making the benefit award decisions. In section 4, the data are described, while in section 5 our empirical strategy is presented. Estimation results are discussed in section 6.
Finally, concluding remarks and recommendations are given in section 7.
Institutional setting

A brief history
The current Dutch DI system (WAO) was originally introduced in 1967, and was meant to provide insurance against the risk of earnings loss due to disability. During the 1970s, the annual growth rate of DI recipients was about 11 percent, which was much higher than expected at the introduction of the system. Program expenditures grew even faster, so that corrective policy measures were needed to alleviate the financial burden. During the 1980s various actions were taken, with major adjustments becoming active in 1985 and 1987. Main features of the reforms were the reduction of the replacement rate from 80 percent to 70 percent, introduction of a more equal treatment of men and women, and disconnection of the disability and unemployment component in the DI program by removing labour market considerations from disability assessment. In that same year, Unemployment Insurance (UI) was reformed as well, most notably by the introduction of work experience as a criterion for unemployment benefit duration.
However, in the early 1990s it became clear that these adjustments did not lead to the expected volume and cost reducing effects. Thus, the second phase of reforms started. More financial incentives were introduced to confront both employees and employers with the financial consequences of the excessive use of sickness and disability benefits. In 1992, a premium differentiation system for sickness benefits and a (not long-lived) no-claim bonus system were introduced (TAV). The system implied that employers had to pay a penalty for each one of their employees entering the DI rolls. On the other hand, a firm employing a DI beneficiary for at least one year received a bonus.
Until 1993, a fully disabled beneficiary received a wage-related benefit (70 percent) of unlimited duration. Since 1993, both the duration of the wage-related benefit and the level of the benefit have depended on the recipient's age and employment history at the moment of DI enrolment. Depending on the age and work history, a fully disabled beneficiary receives a wage-related benefit (70 percent) for at most six years. During the subsequent period, a fully disabled beneficiary has received a base amount of 70 percent of the minimum wage plus a supplement depending on age. Partially disabled receive pro rata benefits. However, the difference between the new and old replacement rates has been repaired in practice for about 80 percent of the employees through collective labour agreements made by the social partners (Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands, 2002 ). This will be further discussed in section 4.1.
A restricted own risk for employers for sickness benefits was introduced in 1994 (TZ) in order to reduce absence through illness. Large firms became responsible for the continued payment of wages during the first six weeks of sickness, and small firms for the first two weeks. Since 1996 employers must pay sickness benefits during the entire first year (WULBZ). The no-claim bonus system introduced in 1992 was lifted again in 1995 and replaced by a system of experience rating (PEMBA) in 1998. Furthermore firms could decide to opt out of the public system to bear the risk themselves or to reinsure the risk with private insurance companies.
More recent policies during the late 1990s and early 2000s are aimed at achieving a more efficient administration. This has resulted in the merger of five different administrative offices into one public monopoly which is responsible for the administration of all DI and UI benefits in the Netherlands. This is not to say, however, that no further reforms will be made. Based on proposals of the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (2002), it is likely that the DI system will be split into two parts: a public insurance for the fully and long-lasting disabled and a private insurance for the temporarily disabled and partially disabled. will therefore affect the use of the other arrangements. Limiting the conditions for early retirement, for example, may hardly reduce the withdrawal of elderly of the labour market, as they will start using alternative exit routes instead (viz. DI and UI). DI benefits are often perceived to be more attractive than UI benefits. First, DI does not impose a job search requirement. Moreover, UI benefits are of limited duration, while the only temporal aspect of DI entitlement is a periodical re-examination. Improper use of DI benefits as a more generous, and less stigmatising, 9 alternative to unemployment benefits was quite common in the late 1970s and 1980s. It provided employers with a flexible instrument to reduce the labour force at will and kept official unemployment rates low (Aarts and de Jong, 1992) . Several studies for the Netherlands have shown that the share of hidden unemployment within DI schemes lies between 10 and 50 percent. 10 Research for the United States shows similar results. Accounting for the role of disability in inducing labour force exit among the low-skilled unemployed, Autor and Duggan (2002) estimated that the US unemployment rate would be two-thirds of a percentage point higher were it not for the liberalised DI system.
The current position of Disability Insurance in the Netherlands
Disability Insurance benefits and individual behaviour
Three months before finishing the period on sickness benefits, an individual may apply for DI benefits. Subsequently, the Dutch Social Benefits Administration (UWV 11 ) decides on the application. A medical examiner verifies and evaluates (physical) limitations and job opportunities, and, based on this examination, the DI administrator decides whether or not to accept the applicant. In case of acceptance, a benefit is awarded for a period of five years, after which a periodical re-examination takes place. The degree of disability is determined by an expert, who compares the applicant's current earnings capacity with his past earnings capacity.
A rejected applicant has the opportunity to appeal. The letter of objection must be sent within the period mentioned in the rejection letter. Subsequently, the DI administrator reconsiders the first decision. The application -award -appeal decision is illustrated in figure 3.1. Note that if an applicant is denied benefits at the reconsideration stage, then he may exercise the option to have his case considered by court. This is not shown in figure 3.1. DI, as well as other employee insurances, suffer from the problem of moral hazard (see, e.g., Barr, 1993) . Imperfect information of the DI administrator in the award and reconsideration decisions leads to higher DI enrolment as a result of an adjustment in the behaviour of the insured population. A second form of moral hazard may be a lack in prevention efforts. In this respect, the DI application and appeal decisions of an individual can be regarded as choices between consumption and leisure, given institutions, health conditions, personal characteristics, working conditions and the expected probability of being granted DI benefits. 12 Obviously, for many applicants this labour supply decision will be severely constrained by their health status.
These individuals will show high demand for leisure irrespective of the financial conditions involved. Nonetheless, the moral hazard problem just described, together with existing empirical evidence (mainly for countries outside the Netherlands), suggests that factors other than health play a significant role in the behaviour of individuals, in particular financial incentives (see section 1). Thus, individuals who are less constrained by their health status are likely to be sensitive to financial incentives, and raise their demand for leisure as it becomes cheaper (that is: as the DI replacement rate becomes higher).
12 Note that the problem of moral hazard equally applies to the employer's behaviour (Aarts en de Jong, 1992; Koning, 
Data
Replacement rates
As was already mentioned in section 2, the exact DI benefit conditions are the result of negotiations by employers' organisations and trade unions. These negotiations, which mostly take place at the sector or firm level, are laid down in collective labour agreements. In the period that will be under consideration, the negotiated collective labour agreements at the sector level were made compulsory by the government for all firms in that sector. The resulting variation in replacement rates over different sectors and firms is exactly the variation we will exploit to identify the elasticity of DI enrolment with respect to the financial incentives involved. The pitfalls involved in this approach will be discussed in later sections.
A database with information on replacement rates for different sectors is available through the Netherlands' Labour Inspectorate. We have made a selection of sectors, such that we were able to match their codes with the sector codes in our data set of individuals. This is necessary in order to be able to connect both data sets and perform an analysis at the micro level (this will be further discussed in section 4.2). The resulting selection of sectors, with corresponding replacement rates, is given in where y 0 denotes current income, ρ is a constant discount factor, and RR 3 is the replacement rate in the third year and years ahead (i.e. the replacement rate remains constant from the third year on).
It can be seen that the average replacement rate in the first year equals 89 percent of the last earned wage, while the second and third year show average replacement rates of 75 and 70 percent, respectively. Thus, the additional benefits on top of the 'official replacement rate' of 70 percent are especially high in the first year of disability. As was noted in section 2.1, the 1993 reform implied that the earnings related benefits became of limited duration, but that this loss in benefits was 'repaired' in most cases. In table A.1 it becomes clear that nearly all sectors supplement DI benefits from the third year on to 70 percent of the last earned wage. Two sectors even have a higher replacement rate for these years of respectively 75 percent (joinery works) and 80 percent (road transport). Most of the variation in replacement rates over different sectors is however in the first and second year. The range of replacement rates in both years is from 70 to 100 percent. The variation in DIWR is however equally affected by the variation in RR 1 , RR 2 and RR 3 , respectively. This can be seen from the decomposition: to DIWR. It turns out that at the discount factor of 0.9, loosely stated, about one third of the variation in DIWR is caused by variation in RR 1 , one third is caused by variation in RR 2 , and one third is caused by variation in RR 3 . At this discount factor level, the 'DI wealth' is seen to equal 7.3 year salaries, with a minimum of 7 year salaries (6 different sectors) and a maximum of 8 year salaries (road transport). A lower discount factor will however result in a lower weight of RR 3 in DI wealth, and generally in lower DI wealth.
Micro data
The Dutch Income Panel dataset "IPO" is based on administrative data from the Dutch National Tax Variables concerning household characteristics, such as the number of persons in the household, the number of minor children (age categories) and marital status;
Financial variables, such as the level of the income, and the source of the income (e.g. wage income, pension benefit, DI benefit, UI benefit). The observation of these variables is in principle on a yearly basis, and relates both to household and individual income. Also, some other financial variables are available, such as outstanding mortgage and real estate appraisal (the so-called "WOZ-value").
The IPO dataset not only contains information on the individuals selected into the sample, but also on the other persons in the households they belong to. These last individuals will also be included in our sample. A great advantage of this dataset is that the observed variables are measured with high accuracy. A drawback of the IPO dataset is however that it lacks some crucial variables which are not related to the household and financial situation of individuals, most notably education and health status.
For our empirical analysis we use data from the period 1996-2000. We select those individuals into our sample who are eligible for receiving DI benefits in case of disability. That is, all individuals with positive wage income on December 31 of the years 1995 until 1999 are selected into our sample. These are precisely the individuals who might enter DI in the subsequent years. Thus, according to our definition, an individual enters the DI scheme when he receives wage income at the beginning of the year (formally, on the last day of the previous year) and receives a DI benefit at some other moment of the year. Note that, as a result of this selection process, the self-employed are also removed from our sample. This is correct, as the self-employed have their own Disability Insurance, which is different from the DI for employees considered in this paper.
In order to assess the effect of financial incentives on the probability of entering the DI scheme, concerned the average macro DI enrolment figure was 1.2% (Lisv, various years) . For a part this can be explained from the fact that our sample is not representative for the entire Dutch population. For instance, the sample does not include the social service sector and the public sector. For another part it follows from the fact that we have multiple observations per person.
The observed inflow percentage however still remains low. 
Empirical strategy
As was discussed in section 3, DI program participation results from two contingencies: the probability that a worker claims to be disabled and applies for DI benefits, and the probability that the claim will be awarded by the program administrator. In most previous research the typical approach has been to estimate a single reduced form model of the final allowance decision. The main reason for this is the lack of data needed to identify the parameters which govern the separate stages of the process. Our analysis will be no exception to this line of research. In contrast, a number of studies were able to estimate a multistage model describing the various stages of the application and award decision (e.g. Lahiri et al., 1995; Riphahn and Kreider, 1998; Benitez-Silva et al., 1999) .
In the previous section it appeared that the observed inflow probabilities in the IPO sample are substantially lower than the aggregate figures (see table 4 .2). This could be the result of incomplete observation of DI enrolment, since the administrations of the National Tax Office and the DI Administration Office are separate. In this section we discuss a strategy which is robust to this problem, provided that the underlying process is correctly specified by the Logit model. Two types of incomplete observation are distinguished. First, it may be the case that individuals entering DI somehow disappear from the sample before it is indicated that they actually receive DI benefits. Second, it may be the case that individuals entering DI remain in the sample but have their status misreported. That is, they are being characterised as working while they are on (partial) DI benefits. In the econometric literature, the first case is known as endogenous selection, while the second is known as misclassification. In the following, we label these as incomplete observation of type I and type II, respectively. In addition, we specify the log-likelihood for our sample subject to the bounded Logit model, and briefly discuss the Hosmer-Lemeshow test in the context of this model.
Incomplete observation
Define Y as the variable indicating whether DI enrolment takes place (Y=1) or not (Y=0), and suppose that this event can be modelled through the well-known Logit model:
where the vector x contains a range of explanatory variables, including a full set of sectorspecific dummy variables (or alternatively, a constant and a set of sector-specific dummy variables related to a 'reference sector'). Under certain regularity conditions, Maximum Likelihood estimation based on (5.1) will produce consistent and efficient estimates of the parameter vector β (see, e.g., Cramer, 2003) . One of these regularity conditions is that observations in the sample are randomly selected from the population. However, in case some of the observations with Y=1 have somehow disappeared from the sample this condition is violated. That is, observations with Y=1 are endogenously selected into the sample.
Proposition 1. Suppose that (i) Y is correctly specified by the Logit model (ii) Y may be incompletely observed (type I) Then maximisation of the likelihood based on the Logit model produces consistent and efficient estimates for all coefficients β in the Logit model, except for the sector-specific dummies (and the intercept, if included).
First, consider the general case where sample selection occurs with the same probability in every sector. Denote with γ the probability that an observation with Y=1 is selected into the sample (0<γ≤1). It is well-known that in a general discrete choice model, consistent parameter This familiar property implies that estimation of the binary Logit model on an endogenous sample will produce consistent and efficient parameter estimates, provided that a constant term is included in the vector x. The 'true value' for β 0 can only be retrieved if γ is known beforehand. The asymptotic standard error of this coefficient also needs a simple adjustment (see, e.g., Scott and Wild, 1997) . Generalisation of this result to the case where the endogenous selection rule differs by sector is straightforward. Suppose that the probability that an individual entering DI is included in the sample equals γ j for sector j. Equation (5.3) then becomes:
The implication is that Maximum Likelihood estimation will again produce consistent and efficient parameter estimates provided that a full set of sector specific dummy variables is included. Similar to the case with the 'general' selection rule in (5.3), consistent estimators for these dummy variables can only be retrieved if the factors γ j are known, while asymptotic standard errors for these dummy variables need to be adjusted. We now turn to the more general case, where both incomplete observation of type I and type II may be present.
Proposition 2. Suppose that (i) Y is correctly specified by the Logit model (ii) Y may be incompletely observed (type I and/or type II) Then maximisation of the likelihood based on the bounded Logit model produces consistent and efficient estimates of all coefficients β in the Logit model, except the sector-specific dummies (and the intercept, if included).
Suppose that a fraction of the observations not having "Y=1" is incorrectly observed, that is 
Hence, the probability of observing "Y=1" equals 
Estimation and testing
Our likelihood is based on (5.7), and writes as: indicates DI enrolment for observation i. In (5.9) the coefficients γ j are suppressed, as these cannot be identified separately from the firm-specific dummy variables contained in β. Each observation corresponds to an individual in a specific year, so that we may have multiple observations for a given individual. The inclusion of individual specific effects into our model is however not an attractive option, as it involves both theoretical and practical problems. First, it is well-known that Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation with the individual fixed effects as parameters alongside β causes the estimates of the latter to be inconsistent. 18 A second, more practical problem, is that this involves the addition of a vast number of parameters (in our case over 30,000!). The alternative approach, which overcomes these two problems, uses Σ ioeA(i,j) y i as a sufficient statistic for the fixed effect of individual j and consistently estimates β from the likelihood conditional on this sufficient statistic (A(i,j) denotes the set of observations {i} which correspond to individual j). This approach is however also problematic because it implies that the model is only identified from the 'within' dimension of the data, which in our case means that only the individuals entering DI contribute to the likelihood, while others (99,5% of our data) are discarded. A second problem with this alternative approach is that no 'average partial effects' or elasticities can be computed, as the fixed effects distribution remains unknown. The second alternative to pooled estimation, the inclusion of random effects, is also not very attractive as it involves the rarely satisfied assumption that these random effects are uncorrelated with the covariates in x. In fact, in a recent Monte Carlo study Greene (2003) finds that random effects estimation is inferior to both fixed effects and pooled estimation. Theoretically, the ML estimate of β not only is inconsistent in the random effects and fixed effects (full estimation) model, but also in the pooled model. In particular, the latter will lead to attenuated estimates of β (see Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 470-472) . However, Greene's Monte
Carlo results suggest that this attenuation bias might be small -in particular for continuous covariates. Moreover, our concern is primarily with the elasticity of r 1 with respect to variables x j (in particular DIWR), which is less sensitive for the neglect of unobserved heterogeneity than the parameters in β; see Appendix B.
In the discussion of the previous subsection it has become clear that the assumption of the Logit specification is crucial for our analysis. It is therefore necessary to test this assumption. For instance, we can test whether the predicted fraction with Y=1 in the sample is consistent with the shape of the (bounded) Logit curve. Suppose that the observations are ordered into G different groups by their predicted probabilities r 1 (i) for individual i, i.e.:
for all g=2, ..., G, and I(g) is the set of individuals in group g. Denote with n g the number of observations in group g, with f g the fraction of observations in this group with Y=1, and with r 1 (g) the average predicted probability of Y=1 for this group. Under the null hypothesis that the observations are in accordance with the (bounded) Logit model, the Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistic (5.11)
has a chi-square distribution with G-2 degrees of freedom (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1980; . When small probabilities are involved, Cramer (2003 Cramer ( , 2004 advocates the use of groups with equal numbers of observations. The point is that if the composition of the groups is based on percentiles of r 1 , then the sample population will be extremely unevenly distributed across different groups, so that the test loses much of its power.
Estimation results
The estimation results for both the Logit and the bounded Logit model are shown in table 6.1.
While the bound in the latter model is significantly different from one at a 5% confidence level, it can be seen that the point estimates of all other parameters are hardly different from those in the Logit model. The most important difference concerns the (asymptotic) confidence intervals which become somewhat wider in the bounded Logit model. As a consequence, the asymptotic t-test for the hypothesis that a parameter equals zero shows diverging results for a few variables.
The score in the bounded Logit model is somewhat better than in the Logit model, though not convincingly so.
The specification includes both the lagged DI enrolment per sector as well as dummy variables for each (broadly defined) sector, in an attempt to correct for sector-specific effects. Lagged DI enrolment is determined over the same sectors as the DI Wealth Rate (see Appendix A), but can be identified separately from the latter as it varies more over different sectors. 20 This variable is likely to be a good first predictor for the individual enrolment probability, and indeed the concerning estimate is close to unity. Furthermore, the significantly positive dummy variable for the Construction sector suggests that, after controlling for individual, household and financial variables, the individual risk of DI enrolment is higher in that sector than in the others.
This seems plausible, as the work in this sector is in general physically more demanding.
However, if incomplete observation of type I (endogenous selection) plays a role here, then both the magnitude and the asymptotic t-statistic for the "Construction" sector are biased downward, so that the estimate may even be on the conservative side.
21
As was apparent in (4.1), the DI Wealth Rate nonlinearly depends on the discount factor ρ. It turned out to be difficult numerically to find the optimal value for this parameter, so that we have repeatedly estimated both models for fixed values of ρ and finally reported those estimates for which the log-Likelihood attained its maximum value. For both the Logit and the bounded Logit model the optimal value for ρ was 0.79, implying an individual discount rate of 21%.
22
The estimation results are however rather insensitive for ( . Thus, our model predicts that a constant replacement rate 20 In fact, the correlation between both variables (over the sample of individuals) amounts no more than 0.11.
of 75% implies a 17% higher probability on DI enrolment than a constant replacement rate of 70%.
23
The other parameter values mostly show their expected signs. The risk of DI enrolment tends to become higher for higher ages. The exception is the age category of 60 to 64, which shows a lower risk than the two younger categories. This can be attributed to the relatively high relevance of the 'competing risks' of unemployment and (official) early retirement. A second explanation is that we have only few observations in this age category (i.e. few individuals having paid work; see table 4.2), so that small sample bias may play a role. For women, it is seen that living together with a partner increases the risk of DI enrolment, while for men there does not appear to be an effect. On the other hand, having young children appears to have a negative impact on the propensity to DI enrolment. There is no obvious explanation for this.
Perhaps parents have a larger incentive to earn sufficient income in order to satisfy the needs of their children.
23 A constant replacement rate of 70% and 75% respectively implies a DIWR of 333.33 and 357.14 (both computed at the discount rate of 21%). Hence, the estimated effect on the enrolment probability equals (3.25·10 -3
)·(357.14-333.33)=17%. The reference categories for these dummy variables are: "younger than 30 years of age", "male/single", "no children", "Transport and Storage", and "1996", respectively. In Table 6 .3, estimation results for alternative specifications are reported. Variants 1 and 2 are the 'extreme cases' of incomplete observation, the first with exclusively type I (endogenous selection) present and the second with exclusively type II (misspecification). The elasticity estimate appears quite robust, as both 'extremes' remain quite close to the basic estimate.
Variants 3-6, a lower discount rate and alternative sector-specific enrolment variables, imply somewhat higher elasticity estimates, but lower likelihoods. b These specifications correspond to those reported in table 6.1.
c In this variant, the bound in the bounded Logit model is fixed at a value equal to the sample average probability of DI enrolment divided by the actual (macro) probability of DI enrolment. The latter has been computed as an average over all relevant years (also see section 4.2). d In this variant, the DI Wealth Rate was summed over the time periods 1 until T, where T equals the number of years until the official retirement age 65. That is, the new formula for DIWR simply follows from replacing ∞ by T in (4.1). The reported results correspond with a discount rate of 14%, which turned out to be optimal with this definition of DIWR.
Conclusion and directions for further research
In this paper, we have estimated the impact of the financial conditions in Disability Insurance (DI) on the individual's probability of DI enrolment. We have found that individuals with relatively high DI Wealth (that is, the ratio of foreseen DI benefits to current income) are more likely to enrol. Based on variation in DI replacement rates between different sectors, the concerning elasticity was estimated at a value of 2.5. In estimating this elasticity, we have controlled for individual and household specific characteristics, and have tried to correct for sector specific effects (other than financial conditions) and the possibility of incomplete observation of DI enrolment.
A possible problem we have not been able to address is that DI replacement rates may in the long term depend on the risk of DI enrolment. That is, labour unions have a stronger incentive to negotiate high replacement rates if the risk of DI enrolment is higher. If this is really the case, then our estimated elasticity may overestimate the true effect. Taking account of such a mechanism will however prove difficult, as no appropriate instruments 24 appear to be available.
A second point which is left for future research is that the current elasticity has been estimated at given eligibility criteria. It is however likely that the elasticity depends (negatively) on eligibility strictness, so that the evaluation of policy measures including a modification in eligibility criteria would require more precise knowledge of this interdependence.
24 That is, variables influencing the replacement rate, but not DI enrolment. A possibility is to estimate a simultaneous model for DI enrolment and the DI replacement rates, but this would require data over a longer time period. The problem with such a long time period is data inconsistency; e.g. the definitions of sectors have changed (in 1993) , and the composition of sectors has also changed over the years. Replacement rates for year t are denoted by RRt. The replacement rate for the third year remains constant for later years, i.e.:
RR3=RR4=RR5=… d
The DI wealth rate (as a percentage of current income) reported in this column is calculated at a discount rate of 10 percent, i.e. ρ=0.9.
Source: Labour Inspectorate
